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Steiner v. Utah: Designing a Constitutional Remedy
by Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason
Introduction
In an earlier article in this publication,1 we 
argued that the Utah Supreme Court failed to 
follow and correctly apply clear U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent in Steiner v. Utah2 when the Utah 
high court held that an internally inconsistent and 
discriminatory state tax regime did not violate the 
dormant commerce clause. Unfortunately, the 
Supreme Court recently declined certiorari in 
Steiner,3 but the issue is unlikely to go away. Not 
every state high court will defy the U.S. Supreme 
Court by refusing to apply the dormant 
commerce clause, and so the Court will sooner or 
later likely find itself facing conflicting 
interpretations of the dormant foreign commerce 
clause. Accordingly, in this article we address an 
issue that we did not cover in our earlier article: 
how Utah could revise its tax system to satisfy the 
Constitution.
The Case: Steiner v. Utah
As we explained at greater length in our first 
article on Steiner, the challenged Utah tax regime 
is internally inconsistent, and hence it 
unconstitutionally violates the dormant foreign 
commerce clause. First introduced in 1983 in 
Container Corp.,4 and emphatically reinforced in 
2015 in Wynne,5 the internal consistency test 
requires a court evaluating a dormant commerce 
clause challenge to a state tax to assume that all 
other jurisdictions (typically depicted as a single 
hypothetical jurisdiction) adopt the challenged 
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1
Michael S. Knoll and Ruth Mason, “Why the Supreme Court Should 
Grant Certiorari in Steiner v. Utah,” Tax Notes State, Feb. 3, 2020, p. 377.
2
449 P.3d 189 (Utah 2019).
3
Steiner v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2020 WL 871753 (Mem).
4
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159, 169 
(1983).
5
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S.___, 135 S. 
Ct. 1787 (2015).
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state’s tax system. The court then asks — under 
these conditions of hypothetical harmonization 
— if cross-border commerce would be taxed 
more heavily than in-state commerce. If cross-
border commerce is taxed more heavily, then the 
tax discriminates, and it will almost always be 
struck down.
Despite the Utah Supreme Court’s 
protestations to the contrary, it is straightforward 
to apply the internal consistency test to Utah’s 
system of cross-border taxation.6 Utah imposes a 
flat income tax of 5 percent on both the 
worldwide income of residents and the Utah 
income of nonresidents, including residents of 
other countries.7 Although Utah provides its 
residents with credits for source taxes assessed 
by other U.S. states,8 it does not credit source 
taxes assessed in other countries.9
As we noted in our prior article, when we 
apply the internal consistency test to Utah’s tax 
regime for taxing foreign income, we assume that 
all subnational taxing jurisdictions adopt the 
Utah regime. Thus, assume a Canadian province, 
say Ontario, adopts the Utah tax system.10 
Ontario would tax Ontario residents at 5 percent 
on their worldwide income, and it would tax 
nonresidents at 5 percent on their income earned 
in Ontario. Like Utah, Ontario would credit taxes 
assessed by fellow provinces, but not taxes 
assessed abroad. Hence, residents of Utah would 
be taxed at 5 percent on their income earned in 
Utah and at 10 percent on their income earned in 
Ontario. Similarly, residents of Ontario would be 
taxed at 5 percent on their income earned in 
Ontario and at 10 percent on their income earned 
in Utah. Accordingly, because cross-border 
income is taxed more heavily (10 percent) than 
income earned in the residence jurisdiction (5 
percent), the Utah tax is internally inconsistent 
regarding foreign income. Thus, the Utah tax is 
discriminatory, and the Utah Supreme Court 
should have struck it down. Table 1 illustrates the 
result.
In sum, the Utah tax regime is internally 
inconsistent and thus discriminates between in-
state and foreign commerce. It therefore violates 
the commerce clause and should be struck down, 
unless the state can justify its discrimination, 
which it has not tried to do. Accordingly, to 
comply with the U.S. Constitution, Utah must 
amend its tax law.
Designing a Constitutional State Tax of 
Foreign Income
In this part, we consider how Utah could 
revise its tax treatment of foreign income to make 
it internally consistent, and therefore compliant 
with the dormant commerce clause. Utah has 
available to it a wide variety of options for curing 
the constitutional infirmity in its tax regime, and 
they fall into three major patterns: 
apportionment, rate recalibration, and tax 
credits. We present examples from all three 
groups that would satisfy the internal 
consistency test.
Apportionment
One way that Utah could satisfy the internal 
consistency test would be by moving away from 
using separate accounting and arm’s-length 
pricing and toward adopting a system that 
apportioned income across jurisdictions. At one 
point in the proceedings, the Steiners proposed a 
6
The Utah Tax Court applied the internal consistency test to the facts 
in Steiner quickly, correctly, and with no fuss. Steiner v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, No. 170901774, at 6-7 (Utah Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2018).
7
The Utah statutory income tax rate is a flat 4.95 percent; from 2008 
through 2017, it was a flat 5 percent. Official Utah Income Tax 
Information. Throughout this article, we use a 5 percent rate for 
simplicity.
8
The credit is available under Utah Code section 59-10-1003. This 
credit makes the Utah regime internally consistent regarding interstate 
income. The Utah regime is only internally inconsistent in its treatment 
of foreign income.
9
Utah Code section 59-10-115 allows “an adjustment to adjusted 
gross income of a resident or nonresident individual [who] would 
otherwise . . . suffer a double tax detriment under this part,” but the 
Utah tax administration denied the Steiners equitable relief.
10
Under the Canada-U.S. Tax Treaty, which took effect in 1984, the 
U.S. taxes covered by the treaty are the federal income tax and some 
excise taxes on private foundations, and in limited circumstances Social 
Security taxes. State taxes are not covered. Similarly, in Canada, only 
Canadian federal taxes are covered. Any taxes imposed on behalf of 
Canada’s subnational governments are not covered. Canada-U.S. Tax 
Treaty, Article II (1984).
Table 1: Utah’s Tax Treatment of Income Earned 
Abroad Is Internally Inconsistent
Residence
Utah Ontario
Source Utah 5% 10%
Ontario 10% 5%
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hybrid tax system that would combine both 
separate accounting and apportionment. The 
Steiners proposed that Utah apportion their 
foreign income among the U.S. states in the same 
manner that Utah apportions corporate income 
among the states, and tax only that portion 
allocated thereby to Utah.11 Under the Steiners’ 
proposal, Utah would continue to use separate 
accounting to allocate to itself Utahns’ Utah-
source income and the Utah-source income of 
foreign residents. The state would then add to 
income a share of their foreign income 
determined by calculating a weighted average of 
their property, payroll, and sales in Utah as 
compared to their property, payroll, and sales in 
the United States. This approach obviously fails 
internal consistency because under hypothetical 
harmonization, foreign income would be taxed 
both where it is earned and where the owner 
resides, whereas there would be only one level of 
tax when income was earned in the country 
where the owner resides.12 Thus, the Steiners’ 
proposed apportionment system could not save 
Utah’s tax system.
In contrast with the Steiners’ apportionment 
proposal, there are two apportionment methods 
that Utah could adopt that would satisfy the 
internal consistency test without having to 
change its tax rates. These methods are:
• Option 1. Domestic apportionment. Utah 
could apportion only domestic income 
across the states.
• Option 2. Worldwide apportionment. Utah 
could apportion worldwide income across 
the globe.
Option 1: Domestic Apportionment
Although the Steiners’ suggestion is similar 
to the method that Utah (and many other states) 
uses to apportion corporate income for tax 
purposes, their proposal is not internally 
consistent because it assigns all domestic income 
to domestic jurisdictions and also apportions all 
foreign income among domestic jurisdictions. In 
contrast, a tax system that apportioned domestic 
income among the 50 states and exempted 
foreign income from U.S. taxation would be 
internally consistent. If universalized, such a 
system would tax all income only in the country 
where it was earned. Although such a system 
would be constitutional, all foreign income 
earned by Utahns would be excluded from the 
Utah tax base.13
Option 2: Worldwide Apportionment
The Steiners’ suggestion also bears some 
resemblance to California’s worldwide taxation 
of unitary businesses that the Supreme Court 
twice upheld,14 but which California has since 
retreated from in the face of heavy foreign 
pressure.15 The two methods, however, are not 
equivalent. Under the California method 
approved by the Court, the state first calculated a 
unitary taxpayer’s worldwide income and then 
apportioned that income to California using a 
weighted average of the worldwide 
apportionment factors (property, payroll, and 
sales).
The weighted average compares a taxpayer’s 
California presence to its worldwide presence. 
Such a system is internally consistent because 
under hypothetical harmonization all income is 
taxed once and only once. The unitary income 
was divided among jurisdictions according to the 
relative presence in each jurisdiction of the 
unitary business’s factors of production. Under 
this approach, Utah would be able to tax its 
proportional share of the foreign income of 
Utahns, but Utah would also have to exempt the 
share of Utah income of residents that was 
allocable elsewhere under the formula.16
11
Utah apportions corporate income by calculating a corporation’s 
U.S. income (its foreign income is excluded) and then apportioning 
income to Utah by calculating a weighted average of the apportionment 
factors (property, payroll, and sales in Utah divided by total U.S. 
property, payroll, and sales) and multiplying the corporation’s U.S. 
income by the weighted average of its Utah apportionment factors. This 
method compares a taxpayer’s Utah presence to its U.S. presence.
12
The Steiners’ proposal would still fail internal consistency if their 
foreign income was apportioned using worldwide rather than U.S.-
factor shares. In that case, some cross-border income would be taxed 
twice, whereas domestic income would still be taxed once.
13
Of course, such a system would mean that Utah would forgo its 
practice of taxing Utahns’ income earned in other states and granting 
Utahns a credit for taxes paid to the other states.
14
See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 
(1994); and Container Corp., 463 U.S. 159.
15
See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 306 (noting that California and other 
states that required worldwide reporting had amended their combined 
reporting regimes to allow election of a “water’s edge” treatment that 
confines apportionment to U.S.-source income).
16
As with domestic apportionment, such a system would mean that 
Utah would forgo taxing Utahns’ income earned in other states and 
granting a credit for taxes paid to other states.
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Rate Recalibration
As described above, Utah could satisfy the 
internal consistency test and maintain its rate 
structure without granting tax credits by 
adopting either domestic or worldwide 
apportionment. Such an approach, however, 
would end Utah’s practice of assigning income to 
a jurisdiction using separate accounting and the 
arm’s-length principle. Because switching to 
apportionment would constitute a fundamental 
change in its tax system for individuals, we next 
describe the two approaches available to Utah 
that maintain separate accounting.
Utah could reconfigure the rates of its tax 
system so that under internal consistency, the tax 
on Utah-source income earned by Utahns (that is, 
domestic tax) was no higher than the 
combination of the tax on Utahns’ economic 
activities abroad (outbound tax) plus the tax on 
foreign residents’ economic activities in Utah 
(inbound tax). Its goal, in amending its rate 
structure to comply with the dormant foreign 
commerce clause, would be to satisfy the 
following tax rate condition:
Td ≥ To+ Ti– (To x Ti)
Td, or the domestic tax, is Utah’s tax on 
Utahns’ in-state income; To, or the outbound tax is 
Utah’s tax on Utahns’ foreign-source income, and 
Ti, or the inbound tax, is Utah’s tax rate on 
nonresident aliens’ in-state income.17
Although there are infinitely many 
combinations of these three rates that would 
satisfy internal consistency, we note the 
following three options because each involves 
changing only one of the three tax rates as 
compared with Utah’s current system.
• Option 3. Eliminate the Outbound Tax. 
Utah could lower the outbound tax to zero. 
In other words, it could exclude Utah 
residents’ foreign-source income.
• Option 4. Eliminate the Inbound Tax. Utah 
could also eliminate the inbound tax on 
foreign residents who earn income in the 
state. Utah could continue to tax the foreign 
income of residents, along with the 
domestic income of residents, but forgo 
taxing the in-state income of foreign 
residents.
• Option 5. Increase the Domestic Tax Rate. 
Utah could alternatively increase the tax 
rate on the in-state income of Utah residents 
to eliminate the current regime’s excess 
burden on cross-border commerce.
Option 3: Eliminate the Outbound Tax
The simplest approach toward foreign 
income and the most straightforward to examine 
is an exclusion of Utahns’ foreign-source income. 
Such a cross-border tax system is sometimes 
called territorial taxation or exemption, and, as 
can be readily seen, it is internally consistent. If 
Utah were to exclude residents’ foreign income, 
and if Ontario were assumed to adopt the same 
tax system as Utah (as the internal consistency 
test calls for), then residents of Utah and 
residents of Ontario would both be taxed at 5 
percent wherever they earn income. No one 
would be taxed at home on income earned in the 
other country. Because the total tax rate would be 
5 percent regardless of where one earned income, 
such a Utah tax would be internally consistent. 
Moreover, although Utah’s tax treatment of 
income earned by Utah residents in other U.S. 
states would differ from its tax treatment of 
income earned by Utah residents in foreign 
countries, there should be no tension between 
them because they both work with Utah having a 
tax rate of 5 percent on Utahns’ in-state income.18
Option 4: Eliminate the Inbound Tax
Alternatively, Utah could eliminate its 
discrimination against foreign commerce 
without changing its tax treatment of Utahns’ 
domestic or foreign income if Utah were willing 
to forgo taxing the Utah income of foreign 
residents. Such a tax is internally consistent 
because in the hypothetical harmonization 
Ontario would not tax Utahns’ Ontario income 
and hence taxation of foreign income would only 
occur in the state of residence and at the same rate 
as for in-state income. Moreover, such a tax 
17
See Knoll and Mason, “The Economic Foundations of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause,” 103 Va. L. Rev. 309, 323 (2017); and Ryan Lirette and 
Alan D. Viard, “Putting the Commerce Back in the Dormant Commerce 
Clause: State Taxes, State Subsidies, and Commerce Neutrality,” 24 J. of 
L. & Pol’y 467, 483 (2016).
18
This would be so if Utah retained the tax credit available under 
current law for source taxes assessed by other U.S. states.
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system, although different from the treatment of 
income earned in other U.S. states, can exist 
alongside a full credit for taxes paid to other U.S. 
states without creating tension because both 
systems are internally consistent with the same 
tax rate on Utahns’ in-state income.
Option 5: Increase the Domestic Tax Rate
Every taxpayer bringing a dormant 
commerce clause challenge against a state tax 
hopes that the remedy will be a refund of tax. But 
discrimination can be cured not only by 
refunding taxes to the group that experienced 
discrimination, but also by increasing the taxes of 
the favored group. As the Supreme Court 
observed in Wynne:
Whenever government impermissibly 
treats like cases differently, it can cure the 
violation by either “leveling up” or 
“leveling down.” Whenever a State 
impermissibly taxes interstate commerce 
at a higher rate than intrastate commerce, 
that infirmity could be cured by lowering 
the higher rate, raising the lower rate, or a 
combination of the two.19
Utah can make its tax system internally 
consistent not only by lowering taxes, but also by 
raising taxes that residents pay on in-state 
income. Specifically, Utah could increase the tax 
rate on the in-state income of Utahns up to the 
sum of the tax rate on nonresidents’ Utah income 
and residents’ out-of-state income.20 For example, 
if Utah were to increase the tax rate on residents’ 
domestic income from 5 percent to roughly 10 
percent,21 Utah could retain its 5 percent tax rate 
on Utahns’ foreign income and its 5 percent tax 
rate on the Utah income of nonresidents. If such a 
tax were universalized, then both foreign and in-
state income would be taxed at 10 percent. 
Accordingly, such a tax system is internally 
consistent in its treatment of foreign and in-state 
income.
Such an approach, however, would impose a 
higher tax on Utahns’ in-state income than is 
necessary to achieve internal consistency 
regarding interstate commerce. As a result, such a 
tax would discourage Utah residents from 
earning income in Utah as compared with 
residents from other U.S. states.22 Such reverse 
discrimination is not unconstitutional, but it is 
not common, either, as it is politically 
unpalatable.
Thus, there are several ways that Utah could 
revise its tax laws without granting a tax credit on 
foreign income so that its treatment of foreign 
income was internally consistent. We next 
examine the different ways that Utah could use 
tax credits to achieve internal consistency.
Tax Credits
The final class of tax systems that satisfies 
internal consistency is worldwide taxation with a 
limited (or more generous) tax credit. A limited 
tax credit is a credit offered by a residence state 
for taxes paid to other jurisdictions on income 
earned in other jurisdictions up to, but not 
beyond, the taxpayer’s tentative tax liability to 
the residence state on the same income.23 Income 
tax systems with a limited tax credit (but no 
more) are fairly common. There are at least two 
ways that Utah could grant tax credits to Utah 
residents with foreign income that would 
arguably be consistent with the internal 
consistency test:
• Option 6. Mirror image credit. States 
(subnational political divisions) could 
credit all taxes paid to foreign subnational 
political entities but not taxes paid to 
foreign national governments.
• Option 7. Residual credit. States could 
credit foreign taxes paid (whether paid to 
national governments or political 
subdivisions) to the extent such taxes are 
19
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1806.
20
See Knoll and Mason, supra note 18, at 341.
21
If the Utah tax rate on residents’ out-of-state and on nonresidents’ 
in-state income was 5 percent and Utah taxed its residents on their 
worldwide income without allowing a deduction for taxes paid to other 
states, then the tax rate on residents’ in-state income would have to rise 
to 10 percent to achieve internal consistency. If, however, Utah allowed 
residents a deduction for the taxes paid on foreign income, then the in-
state rate would have to rise to only 9.75 percent.
22
Such a tax would also provide Utahns with a tax-induced 
advantage over nonresidents in earning income in other U.S. states.
23
No state offers an unlimited tax credit. Because such a system has 
the potential to lead to massive refunds, at most states offer a limited 
credit that would zero out the taxpayer’s liability to the residence state.
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not credited by the U.S. federal 
government.
Option 6: Mirror Image Credit
Utah could follow the lead of some states and 
municipalities after Wynne and adopt a mirror 
image tax system for the credit. Under this 
approach, Utah would credit taxes paid abroad if, 
but only if, those taxes are assessed at a 
subnational level similar to the level of the U.S. 
states. Such a system, which is how Utah taxes 
income earned by its residents in other U.S. 
states, would be internally consistent. Such a 
credit, however, would overcompensate Utah 
residents whenever a resident’s federal credit had 
already effectively compensated them for 
subnational foreign taxes.24
This possibility of a double credit might lead 
Utah to restrict access to the credit. Utah might do 
so directly by prohibiting double crediting of 
subnational taxes. Such techniques implicate the 
external consistency strand of tax discrimination, 
which requires a reasonable connection between 
the income the state seeks to tax and the income-
generating activities conducted in state.25
Option 7: Residual Credit
An alternative approach to the foreign tax 
credit would start with the recognition that a 
dollar of tax is a dollar of tax whether it is 
imposed at the national or subnational level. 
Thus, it makes sense to provide a state credit for 
taxes paid to foreign national and subnational 
governments if those taxes have not already been 
credited by the U.S. federal government. Such an 
approach would allow a state credit once the 
foreign national-plus-subnational tax rate 
exceeded the federal rate. The Utah credit could 
be limited by the federal tax rate plus the Utah tax 
rate on in-state income. Such an approach is a 
holistic approach to internal consistency; it 
compares the full tax liability.26
Conclusion
Although the Utah tax system is internally 
inconsistent and hence discriminates against 
foreign commerce in violation of the dormant 
foreign commerce clause, there are several 
alternative means readily available to Utah to 
modify its tax regime to eliminate that 
discrimination and meet its constitutional 
obligations. 
24
Utah residents would be overcompensated whenever foreign taxes 
were less than federal taxes on the same income.
25
Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 169.
26
For some taxpayers in some circumstances, this calculation can be 
complex.
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